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Showing Up: Eyewitness-Identification
Requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
A Comparative Case Study
Carrie Leonetti*
ABSTRACT
Almost all jurisdictions in the United States, at least under some
circumstances, permit the highly suggestive procedure of a "showup"-
in essence, a one-person lineup containing only the suspect. In Bosnia
and Herzegovina, on the other hand, identifications resulting from
showups are categorically prohibited, even though requiring full lineups
in all cases inevitably causes relative delays in police investigations.
This case study explores that crucial difference between the two systems
and attempts to assess what, if anything, the United States could learn
from the Bosnian requirement that eyewitnesses always be shown fillers,
in addition to the suspect, when being asked to make identifications.
This Article contains a summary of interviews with key domestic
and international judges, prosecutors, criminal-defense attorneys, and
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law-enforcement officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as
participant comments, as part of a case study of the Bosnian rules
governing eyewitness identification. It also contains the author's
reflections and recommendations that resulted from these interviews.
The recommendations are designed to ensure that he United States does
a better job of protecting the innocent by rethinking its approach to
eyewitness identifications, the consequences of suggestive and unreliable
practices, and the relationship between exclusionary rules and deterrence.
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INTRODUCTION
When a police investigation yields evidence against a criminal
accused that is both inculpatory and potentially unreliable, it creates a
dilemma for criminal-justice systems because evidence can be
categorically unreliable (i.e., come from a category of evidence that is
concerning in the aggregate) but nonetheless individually probative of
the guilt or innocence of a particular accused. The dilemma, therefore, is
whether to exclude such evidence from the jury's consideration and risk
that the jury will make an inaccurate decision to acquit (a "false
negative") or to include it and risk that the jury will make an inaccurate
decision to convict (a "false positive"). In the United States, the rules of
evidence and criminal procedure categorically exclude certain classes of
evidence-coerced confessions, polygraph examinations, hypnotically
induced testimony-no matter how probative they may be, because their
questionable reliability in the aggregate outweighs their probative value
in any given case.
Eyewitness identification exemplifies the dilemma. An eyewitness
identifies a suspect, previously unknown to the witness, as the
perpetrator. The suspect becomes the defendant, and the police stop
investigating other possible suspects. The eyewitness is certain of the
identification, but it is well known that such identifications are not very
reliable.' Presumably, there is no way to know, at least in most cases, if
this, or any, particular identification is actually correct.
If there were a way to determine accuracy, the identification itself
would no longer be important to the prosecution's case. If the system
excludes the identification because of its valid reliability concerns, the
jury will never know that the victim identified the suspect, resulting in a
potentially serious loss for a system that seeks the truth as one of its
goals. If the system includes the identification because of its probative
value, the jury may not understand that the identification may have a
significant chance of being incorrect, potentially resulting in an innocent
person being convicted. Different systems address this dilemma
differently.
In the United States, this dilemma, at least as regards eyewitness
identification, is largely resolved in favor of including the evidence and
1. See infra Part I.
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letting the jury decide whether to credit it, rather than throwing out the
proverbial baby with its bath water.2 One example of this preference for
"letting the jury sort it out" occurs in the context of "showup"
identifications. Although lay people tend to picture a six-person lineup
(or photographic array) when thinking about eyewitness identifications,
in many American jurisdictions, eyewitness identifications are often
done by showups-a highly suggestive procedure of a one-person lineup
containing only the suspect (i.e., "Is this the guy who robbed you?").
In Bosnia and Herzegovina,3 on the other hand, identifications
resulting from showups are categorically prohibited, even though
requiring full lineups in all cases inevitably causes some delays in police
investigations relative to those in which showups are used.4 This case
study explores that crucial difference between the two systems and
attempts to assess what, if anything, the United States could learn from
the Bosnian requirement that eyewitnesses be shown fillers, in addition
to the suspect, when being asked to make identifications.
This study involved: (1) a review of the provisions of the Bosnian-
Herzegovinan Criminal Procedure Code ("BiH CPC") relating to the
admissibility of eyewitness identifications at criminal trials,5 as well as
the published scientific and legal literature regarding the reliability and
admissibility of eyewitness identification; (2) interviews with key
domestic and international judges, prosecutors, criminal-defense
attorneys, and law-enforcement officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
(3) collection and review of key data, information, and reports on
Bosnia's eyewitness-identification procedures, including information
from the BiH Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Department and the
Court of BiH. The author, in collaboration with the University of
Sarajevo Faculty of Criminalistics, Criminology, and Security Studies
and pursuant to a Fulbright Scholar grant from the U.S. Department of
State, met with Bosnian criminal-justice leaders, including prosecutors,
judges, academicians, and police officers. In total, she conducted
approximately six days of interviews and met with approximately 15
judges, lawyers, and law-enforcement officers working in the justice
2. See infra Part II.
3. This Article often refers to the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina only as
Bosnia or "BiH" for brevity. BiH consists of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina ("FBiH") and the Republika Srpska ("RS").
4. See infra Part III.
5. The BiH CPC sets forth the rules of criminal procedure that govern the criminal
proceedings of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Chief Prosecutor of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and other participants in criminal proceedings. See Criminal Procedure
Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003, c. 1, art. 1.
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systems of BiH.6 During the meetings, the author asked the participants
to assess the successes and failures of Bosnia's eyewitness-identification
rules and to identify best practices for eyewitness identification.
Specifically, participants were asked to describe: how Bosnia's rules of
criminal procedure governing eyewitness identification came into
existence; the purposes behind their adoption and implementation;
practice for conducting and admitting eyewitness identifications; the rate
of compliance with the rules governing eyewitness identification and the
consequences for the failure to comply, if any; the reasons for
noncompliance, if any; how exclusion of inadmissible identifications
occurs in practice; and how the eyewitness-identification rules fit into the
law of criminal procedure in BiH generally. They were also asked to
opine about whether Bosnia's eyewitness-identification rules have
worked well and why and whether Bosnia's rules governing eyewitness
identifications are beneficial for seeking the truth in criminal trials.
Part I of this Article summarizes the concerns outlined in the social-
science research about the accuracy of eyewitness identification of
strangers and the suggestiveness that often occurs in traditional
eyewitness-identification procedures in the United States, particularly in
light of the recent DNA exonerations of defendants convicted largely on
the basis of eyewitness-identification evidence. In particular, Part I
focuses on the relationship between the quantity of fillers in an
identification procedure (or lack thereof, as is the case with showup
identifications), interpersonal expectancy, and cognitive biases.
Part II describes the legal requirements for the admission of
eyewitness-identification evidence in the United States, focusing on the
federal constitutional procedures for assessing lineups that result from
suggestive identification procedures, as well as the more stringent
procedures adopted recently by a handful of state supreme courts. It also
analyzes the effectiveness of jury instructions and cross-examination to
minimize wrongful convictions from mistaken identifications and the
state of eyewitness-identification "reform."
Part III contains a summary of the BiH rules of criminal procedure
governing eyewitness identifications, as well as the results of interviews
and participant comments obtained uring the case study of the BiH
rules. In particular, it reviews the provisions of the BiH CPC that govern
eyewitness identifications, the use of identification testimony at trial, and
the effect of noncompliance with the code requirements.
6. During some of the interviews, the subject(s) invited an additional person or
persons into the meeting, so the total number of interview subjects may have exceeded
15.
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Part IV discusses the relationship between relatively strict rules of
exclusion for potentially unreliable eyewitness identification and the
resulting identifications in light of the deterrence role that a stricter rule
can play in changing pretrial investigation procedures in the first
instance. Part V contains reflections and recommendations resulting
from the Bosnian case study in comparison to the American system of
rules. The recommendations are designed to ensure that the United
States does a better job of protecting the innocent by rethinking its
approach to eyewitness identifications, the consequences of suggestive
and unreliable practices, and the relationship between exclusionary rules
and deterrence. It recommends that the United States rethink its
eyewitness-identification procedures, particularly its use of showup
identifications, in light of the consequences of using suggestive or
unreliable procedures and argues that the Bosnian eyewitness-
identification rules do a better job of protecting the innocent from
wrongful convictions. Part V also argues that the deterrence benefit of a
stricter exclusionary rule prohibiting eyewitness testimony derived from
suggestive showups would offset the potential loss of probative evidence
of perpetrator guilt by incentivizing the use of more reliable
identification procedures in the first instance.
I. TRUTHINESS: THE PROBLEM WITH EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
A. Background
"Eyewitness testimony is the crack cocaine of the criminal justice
system. Law officers know the potential risks but are addicted to its
power to convict."
7
Eyewitness identification is notoriously unreliable.8 Decades of
social-science, criminal-justice, and behavioral-health research has
proven this overwhelmingly.9 Whether due to faulty memories or subtle
police coercion, eyewitnesses often misidentify the suspect as the
perpetrator.10
The general idea behind eyewitness identification is that a witness
to a crime, whether a victim or bystander, can later accurately establish
7. Steve McGonigle & Jennifer Emily, 18 Dallas County Cases Overturned by
DNA Relied Heavily on Eyewitness Testimony, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 12, 2008),
http://truthinjustice.org/dallas-eyewitness.htm.
8. For an overview on the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony generally, see
Kathryn Segovia, Jeremy Bailenson & Carrie Leonetti, Virtual Lineups, in CRANIOFACIAL






the perpetrator's identity. The assumption is that if the witness had a
good view of the crime and was paying attention to the physical
characteristics of the perpetrator, then the witness's memory will be a
valid indicator of identity, particularly if the witness is certain about his
or her identification.
Psychological research suggests, however, that this trust in
eyewitness testimony is misplaced." Instead, witness memory is like
any other evidence at a crime scene; it must be preserved carefully and
retrieved methodically, or it can be contaminated.'2
B. Traditional Eyewitness-Identification Procedures
Traditionally, in the United States, the police have relied upon one
of three initial identification procedures: lineups, photo arrays, and
showups. A lineup is a procedure in which a criminal suspect, or a
photograph of the suspect, is placed among other people ("live lineup")
or photographs ("photo array"), referred to as fillers or foils, 3 and a
witness is asked whether he or she recognizes anyone present.14 Live
lineups and photo arrays typically contain at least six individuals or
photographs, comprising the suspect and at least five fillers. The
individuals or photographs are then presented to an eyewitness, either
sequentially or simultaneously, for identification. Sometimes, however,
particularly when a live lineup or photo array is not practical due to time
or logistical constraints, the police in the United States will instead resort
to a "showup," the presentation of a single person to the witness, who is
then asked whether the individual is the perpetrator of the crime.15
Although eyewitness identification is one of the most compelling
types of evidence to which a jury or judge is exposed, experimental
research16 and cases of DNA exoneration17 have prompted scholars and
practitioners to question the accuracy, confidence levels, and procedures
11. See id. at 101.
12. See id.
13. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REv.
PSYCHOL. 277, 279 (2003).
14. For practical reasons, photo spreads have become more widely used in the
United States than live lineups. See David A. Fahrenthold, Lack of Suspect Look-a-Likes
Helps Lineup Demise, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2004, at AO1.
15. See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 584 n.1 (Wis. 2005).
16. See generally Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know about Eyewitness
Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 553 (1993).
17. See generally Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness
Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness
Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009).
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surrounding eyewitness-identification evidence.18 While the Academy
has produced a large body of literature criticizing the legal responses to
developing scientific evidence and DNA exonerations,9 this Article will
focus primarily on two of the well-established system variables: the
number of fillers and the retention interval between the eyewitness event
and subsequent identification. These are the two variables around which
there is the greatest divergence between the American and Bosnian rules
for admissibility.
C. The Social Science of Facial Recognition: Experimental Research,
Estimator Variables, and the (In)Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identification
The most important source of information that people use to
identify one another is the face.2° The tricky thing, however, is that
human faces are all very similar to one another."a "[T]he representations
[that people] store in memory that allow [them] to recognize faces are
based around an analysis of surface features-patterns of light and
dark-in which the interrelationships between different parts of the
pattern [are] particularly important.,22  Furthermore, "although visual
memory for faces is remarkable, it is not infallible," and errors in
personal identification are common.23  Visual identifications of
unfamiliar faces are particularly vulnerable to mistakes.2
Social scientists have known for decades that eyewitness
identifications suffer from profound weaknesses in methodology and
reliability. More than 100 years ago, Professor Hugo Miinsterberg, chair
of Harvard's psychology laboratory, undertook the herculean task of
persuading legal scholars, legal professionals, and the general public that
even confident and honest individuals could deliver mistaken eyewitness
18. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (1st ed. 2000) (discussing
the most common factors that led to 62 wrongful convictions).
19. See generally, e.g., Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of American Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 177 (2012);
Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to
Protect he Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REv. 595 (2009) [hereinafter Koosed, Reforming];
Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New
Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41
VAL. U. L. REV. 109 (2006).
20. See Vicki Bruce, Remembering Faces, in THE VISUAL WORLD IN MEMORY 66,
66 (James R. Brockmole ed., 2009).
21. See id
22. See id. at 80.




identifications.25  Armed with extensive experience and knowledge in
psychological research, Miinsterberg pushed psychologists and legal
scholars to investigate the reliability and accuracy of eyewitness
identification more thoroughly.26 He challenged the legal system's
complacent acceptance of eyewitness testimony, and legal scholars
responded harshly with their own counter attacks.27  Despite
Mfinsterberg's efforts and growing experimental-research evidence, his
attempt to inform the field was a "miserable failure."2
Since Miinsterberg's era, many psychologists have undertaken the
now more readily accepted task of studying the reliability of eyewitness
identification.29  Today, hundreds of scientific studies affirm that
eyewitness identification is often inaccurate.3 ° One classic study asked
people to attempt to match high-school graduation photos with pictures
of people taken 25 years later, when they were in their early forties.3'
Study subjects who were unfamiliar with any of the people photographed
were accurate in their identifications approximately 33 percent of the
time. 32  Subjects who were asked to identify their own high-school
classmates 25 years later were accurate approximately 49 percent of the
time.33 Although the Bruck study was not concerned with eyewitness
testimony in criminal trials, it highlights the general concern with
witnesses' ability to identify suspects accurately using their very long-
term memory for faces whose appearance has changed through the aging
process. This is a particularly important consideration when an
eyewitness identification is disputed many years after an alleged crime
has been committed.
Research has identified a number of causes for eyewitness
misidentifications in criminal cases.34 Some factors bearing on the
25. See HUGO MONSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY
AND CRIME 39, 49-69 (1908) (describing the early psychological research on the
malleability and unreliability of eyewitness memories). See generally JAMES M. DOYLE,
TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION
(2005).
26. See generally DOYLE, supra note 25.
27. See generally id.
28. Id. at 10.
29. See generally Segovia, Bailenson & Leonetti, supra note 8.
30. See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 1.
31. See Maggie Bruck et al., Fortysomething: Recognizing Faces at One's 25th
Reunion, 19 MEMORY & COGNITION 221,222 (1991).
32. See id at 224.
33. See id
34. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 639 (1998)
(studying 40 cases of innocent people who were wrongly convicted of serious crimes and
served time in prison-five on death row-and finding that 90% involved eyewitness-
identification evidence in which one or more witnesses falsely identified the suspect).
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reliability of eyewitness identification are the subject of common
knowledge. For example, as most jurors could likely intuit for
themselves, the greater the retention interval (the time between the event
and the identification), the greater the likelihood of misidentification is.
35
Unfortunately, cognitive-science research also documents several
phenomena that are counterintuitive, or at least contrary, to what most
jurors believe about eyewitness reliability.
D. Suggestiveness in the Lineup Procedure: System Variables and
Weapons of Mass Misidentification
Another set of factors affecting the validity of eyewitness
identifications derives from how police lineups are conducted. In some
cases, subtle cues by police-whether intentional or not-lead to false
identifications. Suggestive witness-identification procedures, including
using too few fillers in the lineup and verbal or physical clues from the
police, permanently taint eyewitness memory by blending the new




Lineup fairness is not inherent, but rather it is a result of the
interaction between the lineup fillers and the verbal description of the
suspect as provided by the witness.3 7 One quality that can profoundly
affect lineup fairness is its size.38 Studies have shown that increasing the
number of foils helps to reduce the likelihood of a false identification,39
while "target distinctiveness" significantly decreases the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications and facial recognition.4°
35. See Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification
Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 152 (1986).
36. See Segovia, Bailenson & Leonetti, supra note 8, at 100-01 & nn. 156-75.
37. See id.
38. See Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: How Well Are
Witnesses and Police Performing?, 18 CRIM. JUST. 36, 45 (2003); see also Roy S.
Malpass & R.C.L. Lindsay, Measuring Line-up Fairness, 13 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 1 (1999).
39. Cognitive scientists have roundly condemned the six-person lineup, which is
common in the United States, recommending at least a ten-person lineup. See Penrod,
supra note 38, at 45; Andrew E. Taslitz, Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the Innocent:
The ABA Takes a Stand, 19 CRIM. JUST. 18, 21 (2005). The United Kingdom's standard is
a nine-person lineup, which the police have been able to achieve relatively seamlessly.
See Penrod, supra note 38, at 45.
40. See Shapiro & Penrod, supra note 35, at 145.
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2. Cognitive Biases and Administrators
The dangers of eyewitness error are magnified when the police
employ suggestive techniques in the form of subtle and even unconscious
clues.41 "Cognitive scientists have documented the human tendency for
people to interpret evidence through the lens of their existing beliefs. 42
Once an eyewitness has made an identification, confirmation bias
43
causes the witness to seek information that confirms its accuracy, "tunnel
vision"44 causes him or her to trust information tending to confirm the
identification and distrust information undercutting it, and belief
perseverance45 causes him or her to adhere to the identification even
when the basis for it is later undermined. Cognitive dissonance46 can
play an important role in some eyewitnesses' insistence that people
whom they have identified and who are later exonerated by other
evidence, were nonetheless the perpetrators because the eyewitnesses
cannot bear to believe that they would identify the wrong person. The
41. See Segovia, Bailenson & Leonetti, supra note 8, at 100-01.
42. See Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119,
2134 (2010) [hereinafter Burke, Prosecutors].
43. Confirmation bias causes people unconsciously to seek confirming information
supporting their preexisting beliefs. See Kerala Thie Cowart, On Responsible
Prosecutorial Discretion, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 597, 603 (2009). For example, in
studies in which subjects have been assigned a hypothesis and asked to work to
investigate its validity by asking questions, they often only ask questions that would yield
confirming results. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:
Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1594-96 (2006)
(describing confirmation bias and its possible effects on prosecutorial decision making)
[hereinafter Burke, Decision Making].
44. Tunnel vision, or selective information processing, causes people to rely more
on facts that weigh in favor of their preexisting beliefs than on facts that tend to disprove
them. See Burke, Decision Making, supra note 43, at 1596-99. Tunnel vision results in
people tending to accept at face value information that is consistent with their beliefs,
while resisting inconsistent information. See Burke, Prosecutors, supra note 42, at 2134.
See generally, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). New pieces of information that confirm a prior belief are
likely to be accepted as accurate, while information contradicting a prior belief is
scrutinized more closely and is more likely to be dismissed as false. See Burke, Decision
Making, supra note 43, at 1598-99. For example, one study found that women who
consumed a lot of caffeine were less likely to believe a study that said that caffeine
increased the risk of breast cancer than those who consumed little-to-no caffeine. See
Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal
Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636, 644, 646 (1987).
45. Belief perseverance is the resistance to changing one's beliefs to account for
new information that undercuts them. See Burke, Decision Making, supra note 43, at
1599.
46. See id. at 1601 (stating that cognitive dissonance is the psychological
mechanism by which people believe that their behavior conforms to their personal
philosophy (and vice versa), even when that belief is unfounded).
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result of these cognitive biases, in the context of suggestive showup
identification procedures, is that once the eyewitness has identified the
suspect through a showup procedure, the eyewitness is unlikely ever to
revisit or seriously question that identification in another context.
Eyewitness confidence is malleable and susceptible to influence and
suggestion,47 and such influence can be unintended and unrecognized,
particularly when the administrator of the identification procedure
provides post-identification feedback (confirming or disconfirming).8
Because witness certainty tends to rise over time, witnesses who make
tentative identifications during a showup and who are then told that they
selected the "right" person-either explicitly or implicitly through that
person's subsequent arrest and prosecution-will be even more confident
in their identification at trial.49 Unfortunately, the level of confidence
exhibited by eyewitnesses correlates strongly with juries rendering guilty
verdicts.50
E. DNA Exonerations
Although the results of the aforementioned research have been well
known and tested in the scientific community for decades, the criminal-
justice community did not begin to heed warnings regarding the
inaccuracies of eyewitness identification until the 1990s, when DNA
analysis began exonerating innocent prisoners.51  DNA exonerations
have proven that a significant number of past eyewitness identifications
were incorrect.52  Studies have shown that erroneous eyewitness
identifications are the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in
47. See Crawley v. United States, 320 A.2d 309, 312 (D.C. 1974) ("[l]t is well
recognized that the most positive eyewitness is not necessarily the most reliable.").
48. See Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on
the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 112, 112 (2002).
49. See BRIAN CUTLER, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CHALLENGING YOUR OPPONENT'S
WITNESSES 24-25 (2002); Penrod, supra note 38, at 46.
50. See Michael D. Cicchini & Joseph G. Easton, Reforming the Law on Show-Up
Identifications, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 387 (2010).
51. See Sharon Cohen & Deborah Hastings, Stolen Lives in Prison: DNA Evidence
Is Setting Free the Wrongfully Convicted. But What Happens to Them Then?, CONN. L.
TRIB., June 24, 2002, at 1 (describing an Associated Press study of 110 inmates
exonerated by postconviction DNA testing); Wells & Olson, supra note 13.
52. See Segovia, Bailenson & Leonetti, supra note 8, at 100-01; see also
Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last
visited Mar. 28, 2014). The Innocence Project keeps a running tally of the number of
DNA exonerations nationally on its website. DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNAExonerationsNationwide.php
(last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
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the United States.53 A recent Innocence Project estimate shows that, of
the first 321 DNA exonerations, 72 percent included at least one
misidentification.4
II. U.S. PROCEDURES: THE AMERICAN SOLUTION
These developments in social-science research and the wakeup call
of DNA exoneration cases lead to two inescapable questions: (1) what
can be done to minimize the risks of eyewitness misidentifications; and
(2) would a "cure" in the form of stricter admissibility rules be worse
than the "disease" of unreliable identifications?
Experts have noted that "American courts rely more heavily on
eyewitness identifications to convict defendants than in several other
nations.55  American courts tend to assume that a fair identification
procedure can somehow correct an earlier misidentification resulting
from a suggestive procedure,56 even though social-science evidence
generally invalidates that assumption.
57
Showups, which have been used for decades in the United States
without serious scrutiny, continue to be common. Despite mounting
evidence of the inaccuracy of these traditional eyewitness-identification
procedures and the availability of simple measures to reform them,
showups, perhaps the most inherently suggestive lineup procedures of
all, remain among the most commonly used tools in criminal
investigations in the United States.
58
A. Legal Requirements for Admission of Eyewitness Identification in
the United States
American courts, including the U.S Supreme Court, have
recognized for decades that the inherent inaccuracy of eyewitness
identifications can cause grave miscarriages of justice.5 9 As the Supreme
53. See Wells et al., supra note 34, at 605.
54. DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 52.
55. Mark Roth, Looking Across the Racial Divide: How Eyewitness Testimony Can
Cause Problems, Pittsburgh Post Gazette (Dec. 26, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/news/science/2010/12/26/Looking-across-the-racial-divide-How-eyewitness-
testimony-can-cause-problems/stories/201012260195.
56. See, e.g., Van Pelt v. State, 816 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ark. 1991) ("Even had the
pre-trial identification been impermissibly suggestive, the taint of an improper 'show-up'
was removed by the clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was
based upon [the yewitness's] independent observations of the suspect.").
57. See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 16.
58. See Segovia, Bailenson & Leonetti, supra note 8, at 103.
59. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); Jackson v. Fogg, 589
F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[C]onvictions based solely on testimony that identifies a
defendant previously unknown to the witness are highly suspect."); United States v.
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Court noted 40 years ago: "the vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification.,
60
1. The Federal Due Process Test
The primary constitutional limitation on pretrial lineups in the
United States is the due process limitation on suggestiveness in the
lineup procedure.61 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the federal and
state governments, respectively, from "depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." In the United States, a
defendant may be able to exclude at trial evidence of a pretrial
identification if the lineup procedure "was so unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied
due process of law."
62
Over time, this test has evolved into two concrete steps, both of
which must be met for an eyewitness identification to be barred from
evidence at trial: (1) the pretrial identification procedure must have been
unduly suggestive; and (2) under the totality of the circumstances of the
case, the procedure must have resulted in a significant possibility of a
mistaken identification. The focus of most cases involving challenges to
an eyewitness identification is the reliability of the identification, rather
than the suggestiveness of the procedure, for two reasons. First, most
identification procedures are suggestive (even unduly so) in some way.
Second, under the Court's two-part test, developed in Manson v.
Brathwaite,63 even if a pretrial identification procedure was highly
Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) ("The scientific validity of
the studies confirming the many weaknesses of eyewitness identification cannot be
seriously questioned at this point."); Wehrle v. Brooks, 269 F. Supp. 785, 792 (W.D.N.C.
1966) ("Positive identification of a person not previously known to the witness is perhaps
the most fearful testimony known to the law of evidence."); In re As. H., 851 A.2d 456,
459-60 (D.C. 2004) (citing cases spanning five decades that cast doubt on the reliability
of eyewitness identifications).
60. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (citation omitted).
61. In Wade, the Supreme Court also required, as a precondition of admissibility,
that a defendant have the right to counsel at post-charge lineups. See id. Although the
unreliability of eyewitness identification was a significant part of the Court's rationale in
Wade, the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule stems from a very different constitutional
guarantee, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
690-91 (1972).
Even the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude pretrial identifications from the
operation of the rule excluding hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) (dictating that
the hearsay rule does not bar prior "identification of a person made after perceiving the
person," even when such identification is offered to prove its truth).
62. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
63. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). See infra notes 83 & 84 and accompanying text.
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suggestive, the eyewitness will still be permitted to testify to the
identification at trial if the trial court can be convinced that the
identification resulting from the suggestive pretrial procedure was
nonetheless reliable.64 As a result, many eyewitness identifications fail
the first prong of the test (suggestiveness) but pass the second prong
(reliability).65  In other words, the identifications involve police
procedures that are unnecessarily suggestive, but which courts
nonetheless find to have resulted in sufficiently reliable identifications.
In Stovall v. Denno,66 for example, seven white police officers
brought Stovall, a black stabbing suspect, in handcuffs to the hospital
room of the white stabbing victim. 67  While Stovall was not only in
handcuffs, but also the only black person in the room, the police officers
asked the victim if she could identify him as the man who had stabbed
her, and she said yes.68 Despite the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure,69 the Supreme Court found that Stovall's right to due process
had not been violated because, under the totality of the circumstances,
the witness's hospital identification had been the only one reasonably
available to the police at the time. °
In 1972, in Neil v. Biggers,71 the Supreme Court outlined five
factors for trial courts to consider in determining the admissibility of
pretrial-identification testimony: (1) the eyewitness's opportunity to
view the perpetrator; (2) the eyewitness's degree of attention; (3) the
64. See, e.g., Sharp v. State, 692 S.E.2d 325, 330 (Ga. 2010) (explaining that if an
out-of-court identification is impermissibly suggestive, a subsequent in-court
identification is admissible if it did not depend upon the prior identification); State v.
Auger, 262 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Neb. 1978) (holding that an in-court identification could
properly be received in evidence when it was untainted by the illegal pretrial
identification procedure being challenged); Commonwealth v. McGaghey, 507 A.2d 357,
309 (Pa. 1986) (explaining that the court must determine whether "the in-court
identification resulted from the criminal act and not the suggestive encounter"); McCary
v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 645 (Va. 1984) (holding that the complaining
witnesses' in-court identifications of McCary were not tainted by a suggestive pretrial
identification procedure because the eyewitnesses availed themselves of ample
opportunities to observe McCary before and during his alleged crimes).
65. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 326 So.2d 419, 420 (Fla. 1975) ("There is nothing in
the record that shows the in-court identification was tainted by the prior improper out-of-
court identification procedure."); State v. Skelton, 795 P.2d 349, 356 (Kan. 1990)
(explaining that "an in-court identification is capable of standing on its own even though
a pretrial confrontation was deficient").
66. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
67. See id at 295.
68. See id
69. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232 (1967) ("It is hard to imagine a
situation more clearly conveying the suggestion to the witness that the one presented is
believed is believed guilty by the police [than the presentation to the suspect alone
handcuffed to police officers.]").
70. Stovall, 388 U.S at 302.
71. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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accuracy of the eyewitness's description of the perpetrator; (4) the
eyewitness's level of certainty; and (5) the time lapse between the crime
and the lineup.72 Since Biggers, the Supreme Court has conferred a great
deal of discretion upon trial courts in applying the factors.73 The facts of
the Biggers case provide a good example of the high bar set by the
Court's current due process test. Biggers became a suspect in a rape
investigation.74 The rape victim had spent considerable time with her
assailant and had described him to the police.75 She identified Biggers as
the assailant during a police-station showup.76  She later testified at
Biggers's trial that she had "no doubt" about her identification of Biggers
and that there was something about his face that "I don't think I could
ever forget.,77  Biggers was convicted of her rape and eventually
78instituted habeas corpus proceedings in federal court. The habeas court
found that the showup procedure had been so suggestive that it violated
Biggers's due process rights.79 The Supreme Court reversed the district
court's decision, reinstating Biggers's rape conviction.80  The Court
agreed that the showup procedure had been unnecessarily suggestive, but
concluded that there was nonetheless no substantial likelihood that
Biggers was misidentified, thus the evidence of the identification did not
have to be excluded.81
In 1977, in Brathwaite, the seminal Supreme Court decision
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications, the Court refined
the Biggers five factor test by clarifying the two-step inquiry that courts
should make in determining whether to exclude an eyewitness
identification. The first step is a determination of whether the
identification procedure in question was impermissibly suggestive. The
second step, which is only applied if the answer to the first question was
yes, is whether that impermissibly suggestive procedure resulted in a
"very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.,82 In other
words, an eyewitness identification that resulted from an unduly
suggestive procedure would still be admissible at trial if it were
nonetheless somewhat reliable.
83
72. See id. at 199-200.
73. See generally Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
74. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 195.
75. See id. at 194.
76. See id. at 195.
77. Id. at 196.
78. See id. at 189.
79. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 189.
80. See id. at 201.
81. See id. at 199.
82. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (citing Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968)).
83. Id. at 114.
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Like those of Biggers, the facts of Brathwaite exemplify the
difficulty that defendants have in excluding eyewitness identifications
that result from suggestive procedures. Brathwaite was accused of
selling narcotics to an undercover police officer in a face-to-face drug
transaction.84 The undercover officer did not arrest the drug dealer at the
time of the transaction, however.85 Instead, he gave a description of the
drug dealer to another police officer who obtained a photograph of
Brathwaite-a man who fit the undercover officer's description-and
left it in the undercover officer's office.86 After viewing Brathwaite's
picture only, the undercover officer identified him as the drug dealer.87
At Brathwaite's trial, the photograph was admitted in evidence, and the
undercover officer identified him as both the person in the photograph
and the person from whom the officer had purchased drugs.88 Brathwaite
was, unsurprisingly, convicted of narcotics trafficking.89
Brathwaite, like Biggers, eventually filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court.90 The federal appeals court reversed his
conviction on the grounds that the evidence identifying him as the drug
dealer was unreliable, and the undercover officer's identification of him
from a single photograph was unnecessary and suggestive.91  The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, reinstating Brathwaite's
conviction.92 The Court reiterated that the guarantee of due process did
not compel exclusion of the suggestive pretrial identification of
Brathwaite, as long as it was nonetheless reliable, and concluded that,
under the circumstances, the undercover officer's identification of
Brathwaite was sufficiently reliable.93 The Court based its finding on the
Biggers factors, noting that the undercover officer had a sufficient
opportunity to view the drug dealer and paid attention to identifying him,
gave a timely and complete description of the suspect, was certain in his
identification of Brathwaite, and identified him a short time after his
observation of him during the drug deal.94
Research suggests that this "undue suggestiveness + reliability" test
is not an effective remedy for unreliable pretrial identification procedures
because the five Biggers "reliability" factors are not related to eyewitness
84. Seeid. at 99-101.
85. See id.
86. id.
87. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 101.
88. Id. at 102.
89. See id. at 102-103.
90. See id. at 103.
91. Id.
92. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 117.
93. See id.at 105.
94. See id. at 108-110.
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accuracy.95 On the contrary, three of the five factors--certainty, view,
and attention-are self-reports that are themselves the product of
suggestive procedures.96  Judges also routinely consider descriptions
given after the witness has identified a suspect and the confidence
statements made long after the identification procedure.97 Commentators
have noted the "paucity of decisions finding a due process
suggestiveness violation and excluding the identification evidence"98 and
the resulting lack of deterrence effect that the Court's approach has on
police conduct in administering lineups.99 Nonetheless, almost all of the
state supreme courts in the United States continue to follow the
Brathwaite test under their state constitutions.'00
A defendant challenging a pretrial showup in the United States,
therefore, would have to show not only that the procedure was suggestive
and that the resulting identification was unreliable but also that any
subsequent in-court identification would itself be unreliable because it
was tainted by the showup procedure-i.e., that there was no basis
independent of the suggestive showup from which the court could
conclude that a subsequent in-court identification was reliable. The
result is that the identifications arising out of showups remain almost
universally admissible in the United States-or, at least, universally not
per se inadmissible.
2. A Faint Breeze of Change
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held, under its state constitution,
based on social-science research, that evidence derived from a showup
procedure is inadmissible unless the State could show that the showup
95. See Veronica Stinson et al., How Effective Is the Motion-to-Suppress Safeguard?
Judges' Perceptions of the Suggestiveness and Fairness of Biased Lineup Procedures, 82
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211, 217 (1997); Calvin TerBeek, A Call for Precedential Heads:
Why the Supreme Court's Eyewitness Identification Jurisprudence is Anachronistic and
Out-of-Step with Empirical Reality, 31 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 21, 21-22 (2007); Wells &
Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 17-18.
96. See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 17 (noting that "for deterrence to work,
the use of a suggestive procedure must lower the chances that the witness will receive a
passing score in the second inquiry of Manson" and pointing out that instead "the test
actually raises the score").
97. See id at 18.
98. Robert. P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False
Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice", 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1337,
1386 (2007).
99. See generally Steven P. Grossman, Suggestive Identification: The Supreme
Court's Due Process Test Fails to Meet its Own Criteria, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 53 (1981);
Randolph N. Jonakait, Reliable Identification: Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson
v. Brathwaite?, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 511 (1981).
100. See Cicchini & Easton, supra note 50, at 381.
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was necessary because the police could not have conducted a lineup or
photo-array procedure.10' New York and Massachusetts have adopted
similar rules.1
0 2
More recently, in State v. Henderson,10 3 in a unanimous opinion that
methodically evaluated the totality of current cognitive-science evidence,
the New Jersey Supreme Court modified the Biggers/Brathwaite legal
standard for analyzing the reliability of eyewitness identifications in
criminal cases, which New Jersey had previously followed. 104 The court
found that the New Jersey constitution required major changes in the
way that courts evaluate identification evidence at trial and how they
should instruct juries. For the first time in an American jurisdiction, the
justices of a state supreme court went far beyond the requirements of
Brathwaite by embracing a social-science framework for evaluating
eyewitness identifications in criminal trials, requiring increased scrutiny
prior to the identifications' admission in evidence, and calling on trial
courts to take new measures to address doubts surrounding the reliability
of eyewitness identifications in criminal trials. The justices recognized
that eyewitness identification was inherently flawed and concluded that
the Brathwaite standard for assessing eyewitness-identification evidence
needed to be revised because it did not offer an adequate measure for the
reliability of eyewitness identifications, did not sufficiently deter
inappropriate police conduct, and overstated the jury's ability to evaluate
identification evidence.105  Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court
required that, when defendants show some evidence of suggestiveness,
trial courts consider all relevant system variables, like lineup procedures,
estimator variables, and lighting conditions, in assessing the reliability of
a resulting identification.10 6 The court also required, on the basis of the
social-science research laid out in the special master's report, that
101. See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 584-85 (Wis. 2005) (concluding that
courts should grant the admission of the results of showup identifications under the
Wisconsin Constitution only when necessary due to exigent circumstances); see also PEG
LAUTENSCHLAGER, Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION BEST PRACTICES
2 (June 16, 2005), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docsWIeyewitness.pdf
(recommending, inter alia, the use of "non-suspect fillers chosen to minimize any
suggestiveness that might point toward the suspect").
102. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Mass. 1995) (finding
showups to be "disfavored" and requiring "exigent circumstances" to justify their use);
State v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 382-83 (N.Y. 1981) (characterizing showups as
"flawed" identification procedures and requiring a special showing of need to justify their
use).
103. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
104. See State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254, 265 (N.J. 1988).
105. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877-88.
106. See id. at 878.
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enhanced cautionary jury instructions be given regarding the reliability
of eyewitness identification. 1
07
The following year, the Oregon Supreme Court followed suit in
State v. Lawson.108 In Lawson, the court overturned its previous decision
to follow the federal Biggers/Brathwaite test and revised its state
(nonconstitutional) evidentiary rule in light of the developing scientific
knowledge regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications.1 09
It remains to be seen whether showup identifications will survive
these new tests. In the meantime, rather than following New Jersey's
lead, most American jurisdictions have continued to rely instead on the
adversary nature of American jury trials as an antidote to suggestive
pretrial identifications, primarily in the form of cautionary jury
instructions and the famed "crucible" of cross-examination.
B. Jury Instructions
The American Bar Association ("ABA") and many scholars
encourage courts to consider instructing juries about the teachings of
social science concerning eyewitness inaccuracy in appropriate cases.11°
The New Jersey Supreme Court is not alone among American courts in
requiring a cautionary jury instruction, although other courts generally do
so in lieu of suppressing identifications of questionable reliability (i.e.,
without abandoning Brathwaite).I1l For example, the Seventh Circuit
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions provide:
107. See id.
108. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
109. See id. at 690. A few other state supreme courts had previously rejected or
modified the Biggers/Brathwaite t st in some way. See State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 576
(Kan. 2003) (altering the Biggers factors to include the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her mental acuity, the spontaneity and consistency of the
identification, the nature of the event observed as it relates to perception and memory,
and the respective races of the witness and the suspect); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
781 (Utah 1991) (modifying the Biggers factors to address some of their shortcomings).
110. See Cindy J. O'Hagan, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness
Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 754 (promoting jury instructions in addition to
expert testimony about eyewitness identification evidence); AM. BAR Ass B, ACHIEVING
JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 24 (Paul Giannelli & Myrna
Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] ("Whenever... identity is a central issue
in a case tried before a jury, courts should consider exercising their discretion to use a
specific instruction, tailored to the needs of the individual case, explaining the factors to
be considered in gauging the accuracy of the identification."); see, e.g., CUTLER, supra
note 49, at 159-63; Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of
Investigating Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 25
(2001).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-559 (determining that a
cautionary jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification was appropriate in certain
cases); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 313-14 (Conn. 2005) (requiring cautionary
instructions whenever the police have told an eyewitnesses that the suspect was present in
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You have heard testimony of an identification of a person.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by
the witness. You should consider whether, or to what extent, the
witness had the ability and the opportunity to observe the person at
the time of the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
You should also consider the circumstances under which the witness
later made the identification. The government has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person
who committed the crime charge.12
North Carolina, by statute, mandates that juries be instructed that they
"may consider credible evidence of non-compliance [with statutory
eyewitness-identification procedures] in determining the reliability of the
eyewitness identification."
'" 13
What value do these curative instructions really have? Other
commentators have noted the insufficiency of cautionary jury
instructions to prevent mistaken identification.1 4 Research demonstrates
that jurors fail to understand the jury instructions that they receive15 and
find it extremely hard to disregard powerful evidence, despite
instructions to the contrary.16 These findings have been confirmed in a
the lineup or failed to warn an eyewitness not to assume that the perpetrator was present).
But see Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005) (holding that jurors should not
be instructed to consider eyewitness certainty in evaluating identification evidence).
112. COMM. ON FED. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
PATrERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 3.08
(1998), available at https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattem Jurylnstr/pjury.pdf. Other
courts have refused such an instruction. For example, in Evans v. United States, 484 F.2d
1178 (2d Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to
find error in the trial court's refusal to give Evans's requested specific charge to the jury
regarding the dangers of eyewitness identification, holding that such a charge is "at most.
.. a matter of discretion." Evans, 484 F.2d at 1188; accord United States v. Barber, 442
F.2d 517, 526 (3d Cir. 1971) ("[I]t is necessary neither to instruct the jury that they
should receive certain identification testimony with caution, nor to suggest to them the
inherent unreliability of certain eyewitness identification.").
113. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(d)(3) (2007).
114. See generally Michael H. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions on
Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRIM. &
CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1989); Koosed, Reforming, supra note 19.
115. See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306,
1307 (1979) ("[P]resent[ing] the results of the first empirical, objective linguistic study of
the comprehensibility of. . . standard jury instructions" and "demonstrat~ing] that jury
instructions are inadequately understood"); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What
Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 589, 589 (1997) (examining "the social science research relevant o evaluating the
effectiveness of judicial instructions").
116. See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv.
744, 754 (1959); Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect
Effects ofInadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 305-08 (1983).
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variety of contexts in which jurors have misused evidence in violation of
the court's explicit instructions, including using evidence of a
defendant's prior convictions as evidence of the likelihood of the
defendant's guilt after being instructed not to117 and using evidence
offered for impeachment purposes to determine the issue of liability after
being instructed not to.' Similarly, research shows that curative
instructions do not effectively counter the prejudicial effects on juries of
negative pretrial publicity."1
9
Because jurors have a tendency to accord greater weight to
eyewitness testimony than is often warranted, especially when a witness
exudes confidence in an identification,120 judicial reliance on a jury
instruction to balance the detrimental effect of a suggestive identification
procedure is likely misplaced. Research has provided little evidence that
jurors can understand and appreciate the influence of suggestive
identification procedures like showups or their hidden nature (such as
contextual clues and nonverbal suggestions to the witness). 121
C. Cross-Examination
The American system of criminal justice relies extensively on the
power of good cross-examination to weed out weaknesses in the
prosecution's case. In the end, however, even a skilled cross-
examination may fail to convince the jury to disregard the powerful
impact of an eyewitness's identification of the defendant as the
perpetrator of a crime.122  The infamous wrongful-conviction case of
Arizona v. Youngblood23 speaks not only to the fallibility of eyewitness
identification but also to the limits of cross-examination as a tool for
guaranteeing that a mistaken identification will be effectively exposed at
117. See Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43-47 (1985).
118. See Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The
Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 Soc. BEHAV.
165, 177-81 (1987).
119. See Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media,
the Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 428,442-43 (1997).
120. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
121. See Wells et al., supra note 34 at 21-22; Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau,
Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 768-69 (1995).
122. See O'Toole & Shay, supra note 19, at 135 ("Finally, because the use of
suggestive procedures and unreliable identifications almost always occur with
eyewitnesses who honestly believe their own mistaken identifications, cross-examination
is nearly useless."); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic
Problem?, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 739, 788.
123. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
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trial, especially in a case involving a particularly horrific crime with a
surviving victim making a positive identification.124 In Youngblood, the
defense attorney showed significant inconsistencies between the victim's
description of his assailant and Youngblood and between the victim's
description of his attacker's car and Youngblood's car.125 In the end,
however, despite the inconsistencies in the victim's testimony and the
alibi evidence proffered by the defense, the victim's mistaken
identification prevailed.126 On appeal to the Supreme Court, even Justice
Stevens concluded that the jury's verdict demonstrated that the evidence
against Youngblood was overwhelming.127  Subsequent DNA testing
revealed, however, that Youngblood, who had served seven years in
prison, was not the perpetrator.128  Youngblood and other DNA-
exoneration cases involving eyewitness misidentification are a powerful
indictment of the unwarranted confidence in the ability of the
adversarialism of the American criminal-justice system to screen out
victims of mistaken identification.
129
D. Defense Experts
The American preference for jury determination of the validity of
identifications, rather than judicial determination and exclusion of such
evidence when unreliable, results in the increasingly common practice of
permitting juries to hear expert defense testimony to aid them in
assessing reliability. 30  Some American courts have excluded expert
124. See Uphoff, supra note 122, at 788.
125. See id. at 788-89.
126. See id at 790.
127. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128. See Thomas Stauffer & Jim Erickson, DNA Test Clears Tucsonan Convicted in
Molestation, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 9, 2000, at Al.
129. During the Author's interviews, one Bosnian appellate judge expressed his
skepticism about the helpfulness of confrontation and cross-examination of eyewitnesses
in challenging the credibility of identifications. Interview with Hilmo Vucinic, Judge,
Second Instance Chamber of the BiH Court, in Sarajevo, BiH (June 12, 2012)
[hereinafter Vucinic Interview] (notes on file with Author).
130. See, e.g., Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 1257, 1262, 1280 (D.C. 2009)
(holding that the trial court erred in excluding Benn's proffered expert testimony on the
"unreliability [of] stranger-to-stranger eyewitness identifications" and other specific
factors that could affect the accuracy of an eyewitness's identification and recollection);
People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 375-76 (N.Y. 2007). The court in LeGrandheld:
[W]here the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there
is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant o the crime, it is
an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the
witness's identification of [the] defendant, (2) based on principles that are
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a
qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror.
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testimony on eyewitness reliability because it was deemed to be a matter
of common sense-i.e., "not ... beyond the ken" of the average juror.
13 1
This is despite the fact that most social-science experts conclude that
"jurors, as a matter of common sense, are not fully aware of the factors
that influence eyewitness testimony.,132  Even when courts permit
defense experts to testify regarding the questionable reliability of
eyewitness identifications, there is no empirical evidence that such
testimony affects juries any more than cautionary instructions or cross-
examination.
E. The State of "Reform"
In 1999, the U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno commissioned an
investigation into the first 28 cases of persons who were convicted and
subsequently exonerated by DNA evidence.133  The investigation
documented the first confirmed cases of wrongful convictions that had
been based on erroneous eyewitness identification. The resulting report
fueled an expansion in the research into eyewitness reliability, and led
the Attorney General to conclude that: "Even the most honest and
objective people can make mistakes in recalling and interpreting a
witnessed event; it is the nature of human memory.' 34
Id; State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1117-18 (Utah 2009) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion when it excluded Clopten's expert testimony regarding various
factors that could affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, including cross-racial
identification, the impact of violence and stress during an event, the tendency to focus on
a weapon rather than an individual's facial features, and the suggestive nature of certain
identification procedures used by police). See generally O'Hagan, supra note 110.
131. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923); BRIAN L. CUTLER &
STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE
LAW 217 (1995); Kenneth Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We
Infer Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 258 (1980) ("[T]he
apparent majority of American judges.... acting within permitted judicial discretion, do
not allow expert testimony to be admitted into evidence.").
132. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, JAMES M. DOYLE & JENNIFER E. DYSART, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (5th ed. 2013) § 6-5; see Keith A. Findley, Learning
From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38
CAL. W.L. REV. 333, 334 (2002). Findley explains:
[H]ard evidence shows that jurors do not understand the psychological
processes at work in an eyewitness identification and tend to rely an
unwarranted extent on such identifications .... Nonetheless, courts in many
jurisdictions routinely continue to exclude expert testimony designed to educate
jurors on these matters, often on the ground that such information is within the
common knowledge of jurors or would usurp the role of the jury.
Id. (footnote omitted).
133. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (1999), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf.
134. Id. at iii.
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Despite the criticisms leveled at the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications in light of the social-science data and DNA exonerations,
more than a decade after the U.S. Department of Justice issued its
Eyewitness Evidence report, it still has not produced "any fundamental
change in the vast majority of law enforcement agencies" because the
police culture in the United States has resisted change and many law-
enforcement agents are concerned that the proposed procedures would
"result in a loss of valuable evidence."'135  Only a handful of police
departments have adopted new, evidence-based eyewitness-identification
procedures.3 6 In fact, only a small minority of police departments in the
United States even has a written policy regarding eyewitness-
identification procedures.
137
One reform occasionally proposed during these reform debates
involves prohibiting showup identifications and instead requiring a
certain minimum number of fillers in pretrial identification procedures.138
For this reason, the Bosnian rules governing eyewitness identification
make a good comparative case study in showup reform.
135. Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to
Eyewitness Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 33, 56-57 (2008); see Katherine
R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin 's New Governance Experiment, 2006
Wis. L. REV. 645, 687-89.
136. For example, in 2010, the Texas legislature approved several bills aimed at
remodeling the state's criminal-justice system. One of them set up a task force to write
new procedures for handling eyewitness identifications. See Bobby Cervantes, Houston
Senator's Bills Aim to Stop Wrongful Convictions, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-senator-s-bills-aim-to-stop-
wrongful- 1 684022.php.
137. See, e.g., id.; Roma Khanna, Study: Witness Errors Lead Juries Astray: DNA
Undoes the Mistakes on the Stand During Trials, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Study-Witness-errors-lead-Texas-
juries-astray-1728585.php. But see MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE d 3-50 (2013) (requiring
police departments to prepare written guidelines that "comply with the United States
Department of Justice standards on obtaining accurate eyewitness identification");
EYEwITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE, NORTHAMPTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ADMINISTRATION & OPERATIONS MANUAL, 0-408, at 7-9 to 8-9 (on file with Author)
(requiring that, when showups are conducted, the police "[d]etermine and document the
description of the perpetrator prior to the showup," "consider using other identification
procedures (e.g., lineup, photo array) for remaining witnesses" if one witness makes a
positive identification in a showup, "[c]aution the witness that the person he/she is
looking at may or may not be the perpetrator," "[o]btain and document a statement of
certainty" if the showup results in an identification, and document "[a]ll identifications
and non-identifications"). See generally State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177 (N.J. 2006), App.
A (reprinting the New Jersey Attorney General's guidelines for eyewitness
identifications).
138. See infra Part V; see, e.g., Cicchini & Easton, supra note 50, at 395.
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III. THE BiH CPC: A CASE STUDY IN RETHINKING EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION
The BiH CPC incorporates specific restraints on the investigatory powers
of the police vis-6-vis eyewitness identification. Article 85 of the CPC provides:
Method of Examination, Confrontation and Identification
(1) Witnesses shall be examined individually and in the absence of
other witnesses.
(2) At all times during the proceedings, witnesses may be confronted
with other witnesses or with the suspect or accused.
(3) If necessary to ascertain whether the witness knows the person or
object, first the witness shall be required to describe him/her/it or to
indicate distinctive signs, and then a line-up of persons shall follow,
or the object shall be shown to the witness, if possible among objects
of the same type.
139
A. Requirements of the Code
The Bosnian CPC attacks the problem of unreliable eyewitness
identifications from two sides. On the front end, it attempts to reduce the
risk of error at the time when a witness makes an identification. Article
85(3) requires that eyewitness identification of a suspect or an accused
be conducted by either live or photo-spread lineup procedure.140  The
line-up procedure takes place in three distinct steps.
141
139. Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzigovina, 2003, c. 8, § 5, art. 85.
140. See Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003, c. 8, § 5, art.
85(3). A similar requirement is incorporated into the Code of Criminal Procedure for the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("FBiH CPC"). Criminal Procedure Code of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003, c. 8, § 5, art. 99. The requirements of Art.
85 trace back to the Criminal Procedure Code of the Socialistic Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia ("SFRY"). Vucinic Interview, supra note 129.
In 2009, the FBiH CPC was amended to permit the police to use photo arrays in
the investigation phase, as long as they are not composed from "mug shots," although
their results may not be used as evidence. As a result, photo arrays are rare and occur
only in the early phases of investigation, before the police have a suspect. Interview with
Ivica Buzuk, Superintendent, Edin Dzuho, Marinko Meditch & Mehmed Kola, Heads of
the Property Crime Unit and Officers of the Canton Sarajevo Ministry of Internal Affairs
Crime Investigation Division, in Sarajevo, BiH (June 4, 2012) [hereinafter MUPS
Interview] (notes on file with Author). Instead, the police prefer always to use live
fillers. Id. After the witness flips through the photographs, the police conduct further
investigation and then employ a live lineup. Id.
One exception to this general preference for live lineups over photo arrays arises
in the case of fugitive suspects. In those cases, the police are still required to follow the
requirements of the criminal-procedure code. Interview with Mirsad Shehovic, Deputy
Chief Prosecutor, Sarajevo Cantonal Prosecutor's Office, in Sarajevo, BiH (June 4, 2012)
[hereinafter Shehovic Interview] (notes on file with Author). In those cases, the passage
of time can make an eyewitness's initial identification of the fugitive suspect or a unique
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First, the witness must give a full statement of the event, describing
in detail the suspect and any "distinctive signs.142 This description must
be concrete, not a general description that could describe a relatively
large number of individuals, and the police must promptly record it.
143
The witness signs the statement, including the description, and the
statement is entered in evidence in the court file. 144
Second, only after proper completion of the first step and only if the
police have a suspect, the witness must be shown a lineup of at least five
to six persons selected for their similarity to the description of the
suspect.145 During that lineup, which may be in either live or photo-
spread form, the witness must indicate if the person he or she previously
described is present.146  The Bosnian cantonal police stations have
specially built rooms for lineup procedures.47 The rooms consist of a
viewing room and a lineup room, separated by a two-way mirror. All
eyewitnesses are held in separate police offices apart from the lineup
rooms and escorted in and out of the viewing room one at a time, without
having contact with the suspect or one another.148 If there are multiple
eyewitnesses, they never see one another and are never told if or whom
the other witnesses identified. 149
Third, if the eyewitness selects someone from the lineup, he or she
must give a "confidence statement," indicating his or her level of
certainty that the identification is accurate.15° The witness's responses
during the lineup, positive or negative, must be recorded
simultaneously.151 The entirety of the eyewitness's testimony is included
characteristic of the suspect (for example, a tattoo) out of a photo array more valuable
than an identification at a live lineup conducted much later. Id.
141. MUPS Interview, supra note 140; Interview with Senka Sojkic, Officer,
Organized Crime Unit, Crime Investigation Div., BiH State Investigation & Protection
Agency, in East Sarajevo, BiH (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter SIPA Interview].
142. MUPS Interview, supra note 140; Shehovic Interview, supra note 140; SfPA
Interview, supra note 141; Interview with Adisa Zahiragic, President, BiH Judges' Ass'n,
Sarajevo Cantonal Court, in Sarajevo, BiH (June 4, 2012) [hereinafter Zahiragic
Interview] (notes on file with Author).
143. MUPS Interview, supra note 140; SIPA Interview, supra note 141.
144. MUPS Interview, supra note 140; see, e.g., infra app. A [hereinafter MUPS
Witness Record].
145. Shehovic Interview, supra note 140; SIPA Interview, supra note 141; Zahiragic
Interview, supra note 142.
146. MUPS Interview, supra note 140; Vucinic Interview, supra note 129.
147. MUPS Interview, supra note 140.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.; SIPA Interview, supra note 141; see, e.g., MUPS Witness Record, supra
note 144.
151. See MUPS Interview, supra note 140. In practice, the police comply with the
recording requirement by using a live transcriptionist and a signed witness statement at
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in the official police report, and the fillers and suspects in the photo array
or lineup are photographed by a crime-scene photographer.
152
All lineup procedures, whether in live or photo-spread form, must
be conducted with a minimum of five to six unknown persons of similar
appearance to the person initially described by the witness.5 3  Those
other persons, also known as "foils," must be "of similar appearances
and approximately the same constitution, hair color, similarly dressed,
etc.," and the lineup should take place under light conditions similar to
those in which the witness first saw the suspect.15 4 Both the suspect and
the eyewitnesses have a right to have an attorney present at all lineup
procedures, irrelevant of whether formal charges have been filed,
although attorneys often do not attend the procedures.'55
B. Use of Identification Evidence at Trial
The probative value of any witness identification is determined at
trial in the context of other corroborative evidence or lack thereof.'56
all identification procedures. Id.; SIPA Interview, supra note 141; see, e.g., MUPS
Witness Record, supra note 144.
152. MUPS Interview, supra note 140.
153. See MUPS Interview, supra note 140. In the FBiH, the requirement is to use at
least five fillers. Id.; Shehovic Interview, supra note 140. While the eyewitness-
evidence requirements described in this Article are codified at both the national and
entity level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they predate Bosnia's independence from
Yugoslavia. Going back to the SFRY CPC, the police have always used at least five
individuals (at least four fillers plus the suspect) in their lineup identification procedures.
MUPS interview, supra note 140.
154. MUPS Interview, supra note 140. In the practice, the police generally employ
civilian or administrative employees of the police department as fillers, but, if fillers of
sufficient number and quality are not available, they are also empowered to seize
individuals from public places for use in the lineup procedure. Id. The Sarajevo police
admitted that their lineup fillers often come from the cafes in the neighborhood around
the police station. Id.
155. Id.; SIPA Interview, supra note 141; Interview with Hon. Lejla Konjic, Hon.
Merima Kurtovic-Bilic & Hon. Emir Neradin, Judges, Sarajevo Mun. Court, in Sarajevo,
BiH (June 8, 2012) [hereinafter Mun. Judges Interview] (notes on file with Author). The
police are required to notify the prosecutor's office and the suspect's attorney prior to
conducting the lineup, but it is up to the individual prosecutor and efense attorney to
decide whether to attend. MUPS Interview, supra note 140; SIPA Interview, supra note
141. In practice, the prosecutor and defense attorney attend only post-charge lineups.
MUPS Interview, supra note 140. Suggestiveness concerns still exist, however, even
when defense counsel is present during a lineup. Research shows, for instance, that
judges have difficulty detecting suggestive bias. See Stinson et al., supra note 95, at 211.
Under the criminal procedure codes and in practice, all of these same requirements apply
to the identification of objects, as well-for example, when a victim identifies stolen
property that the police have recovered from a suspect. See Criminal Procedure Code of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003, c. 8, § 5, art. 85(3); MUPS Interview, supra note 140;
Shehovic Interview, supra note 140.
156. Shehovic Interview, supra note 140; Zahiragic Interview, supra note 142.
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Courts employ benchmarks of corroboration to determine the weight and
sufficiency of the identification evidence-for example, the time period
during which the witness observed the alleged perpetrator, the reasons
for the witness's ability to make an accurate identification (e.g., the
suspect's distinguishing features), the witness's certainty, and whether
there is contemporaneous video evidence of the defendant showing him
or her in clothing matching that described by the eyewitness.1 57 The
probative value also depends upon the type of case. For example, in a
robbery or burglary case in which the eyewitness was also the victim, the
court is more likely to place heavy weight on the victim's
identification.1 58 There are very few criminal cases in which a stranger
identification is the only evidence of the defendant's guilt.5 9 For most
judges, an identification, in the absence of other corroborative evidence,
is an insufficient basis to convict. 1
60
C. Effect of Noncompliance
At the back end, the Bosnian CPC attacks the problem of unreliable
eyewitness identifications with serious sanctions for noncompliance.
Failure by the police or prosecutors to abide by any of these procedural
requirements constitutes a violation of the CPC, rendering such
eyewitness identifications invalid and inadmissible as evidence at trial. 161
If a trial court admitted evidence in "essential violation" of the CPC,
such error would require reversal of a trial verdict of guilt. 62  The
exclusionary rule for potentially unreliable eyewitness identifications in
Bosnia, therefore, is broader than the analogous rule in the United
States. 163
157. Mun. Judges Interview, supra note 155; Shehovic Interview, supra note 140;
Zahiragic Interview, supra note 142.
158. Shehovic Interview, supra note 140; Zahiragic Interview, supra note 142.
159. Mun. Judges Interview, supra note 155. Instead, most of the eyewitness-
identification cases involve suspects who are known to their identifiers. Id.
160. Zahiragic Interview, supra note 142.
161. See Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003, c. 1, art. 10(3)
(establishing an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the code); see also
id. at c. 1, art. 10(2) ("The Court may not base its decision ... on evidence obtained
through essential violation of this Code."); see generally id. at c. 23, § 1, art. 297(l)(i)
(providing that it is an essential violation of the CPC "if [a] verdict is based on evidence
that may not be used ... under the provisions of this Code").
162. See Vucinic Interview, supra note 129.
163. But see generally Carrie Leonetti, Does a Rose by Any Other Name Still Smell
as Sweet? The Nature of the Exclusionary Rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina (forthcoming)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Author). Of course, the enforcement of the
exclusionary rule depends upon the judge. Shehovic Interview, supra note 140. Several
Bosnian judges expressed, during their interviews, that they nonetheless consider
identifications that have been "suppressed." Mun. Judges Interview, supra note 155.
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IV. THE DETERRENCE FACTOR
To some-or maybe to a large-extent, the dichotomy posed in the
Introduction to this Article, that the decision whether to admit or exclude
eyewitnesses identifications that are both potentially unreliable and
potentially probative, is a false one. It is false because it ignores a third
choice: conducting eyewitness identifications in a way that eliminates as
much of their unreliability as possible, so that exclusion is unnecessary.
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed that the preferred solution to
the problem of unreliable eyewitness-identification procedures, "where
so many variables and pitfalls exist," is not a trial at which the
prosecution presents the faulty identification and the defense points out
its pitfalls to the jury, but rather "the prevention of unfairness and the
lessening of the hazards of eyewitness identification at the lineup
"itself." 64 This is true, at least in part, because the "grave potential for
prejudice, intentional or not" in a suggestive pretrial identification
procedure "may not be capable of reconstruction at trial."
1 65
Critics of exclusionary rules in general tend to argue that their costs
outweigh their benefits-that the relevant and probative evidence lost as
a result of their operation is too great a cost to pay in the name of
deterrence.66 But that argument is only true if the deterrent does not
work. If police follow strict investigatory procedures and the evidence
that they obtain complies with legal requirements, there is nothing to
exclude. 1
67
V. REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
One recent study estimated that three to five percent of convictions
in the United States are wrongful ones. 68  When the police end a
criminal investigation after the arrest of an innocent person, not only is
164. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
165. Id. at 236.
166. See, e.g., id. (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 et seq. (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
167. Cf. Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 226 (summarizing research demonstrating that defense motions
to suppress suggestive identifications are rarely granted). Cf generally Albert W.
Alschuler, Demisesquicentennial: Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (2008).
168. See D. Michael Risinger, Criminal Law: Innocent Convicted: An Empirically
Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780
(2007) (estimating that wrongful convictions occurred at a rate of 3.3 to 5% in capital
rape-murder cases in the United States in the 1980s).
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the accused left to face false charges but the actual perpetrator is also left
at large, with impunity, possibly to commit more crimes.
169
A. Eyewitness Identification
Eyewitness-identification reform would be a good place to start
addressing and correcting the causes of wrongful convictions in the
United States, but American legislatures, courts, and police departments
have been slow to respond to the crisis. On the one hand, the DNA
exonerations have exposed the unreliability of the eyewitness-
identification procedures that lead to wrongful convictions. On the other
hand, identifications are valuable evidence and can, in the right context,
be reliable means for bringing justice.170  As Gary Wells admonished
years ago: "[M]emory is a form of trace evidence, like blood or semen
or hair, except the trace exist in the witness' head. How you go about
collecting that evidence and preserving it and analyzing it is absolutely
vital.",71
Unlike the analysis of other forms of trace evidence, however, when
eyewitness-identification procedures are unreliable, there is generally no
way to reconstruct the procedures or rerun the test. The reason for this
inability to detect false positives in the context of eyewitness
identification is that suggestive eyewitness procedures tend not only to
produce inaccurate identifications in the first instance but also to taint the
witness's memory moving forward in the second.172 In this sense, "the
eyewitness's memory is gone[,]" and there is no opportunity to "retest"
it.
173
Should the United States continue to allow the use of showup
identification procedures? Should it continue to depend on jurors to
listen to the testimony of eyewitnesses and sort the accurate from the
inaccurate, and, in the process, the innocent from the guilty? Are
showup procedures imply too unreliable? Or is this merely a case of the
169. In its 233 nationwide exoneration cases, the Innocence Project identified 91 of
the actual perpetrators and estimated that 49 rapes and 19 murders were committed by
those perpetrators after innocent people were convicted of their crimes. See Koosed,
Reforming, supra note 19, at 600; Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 23 (noting that
there are deficiencies in a cautionary jury instructions regarding the unreliability of
eyewitness-identification evidence but that they could aid the jury in some individual
cases and deter future suggestive identification practices).
170. Shehovic Interview, supra note 140.
171. D.W. Miller, Looking Askance at Eyewitness Testimony, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Feb. 25, 2000), http://chronicle.com/article/Looking-Askance-at-Eyewitness/87 13/.
172. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitnesses'
Recollections: Can the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 138, 138 (1999).
173. See Koosed, Reforming, supra note 19, at 615-16.
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perfect being the enemy of the good? Although the U.S. Supreme Court
may not revisit the showup any time soon, Bosnia provides a look at the
alternate universe in which showup identifications do not exist.
1. Rethinking the Showup
Scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and a few American courts
have identified steps that can be taken to reduce the risk of eyewitness
misidentifications. In 1998, the American Psychology/Law Society
("AP/LS") released a report recommending four specific eyewitness-
identification procedures that "represent[ed] an emerging consensus
among eyewitness scientists as to key elements that such a set of
procedures must entail. ' 174 One recommendation called for designing
the procedure and selecting fillers so that the suspect would not stand out
in the lineup or photo array in comparison.
175
In 2006, the ABA Criminal Justice Section's Ad Hoc Innocence
Committee to Ensure the Integrity of the Criminal Process, which
comprises of scholars, forensic scientists, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges, released a report recommending "best practices" for
eyewitness-identification procedures.176  The ABA recommendations
included procedures for the selection of fillers, employing "a sufficient
number of foils to reasonably reduce the risk of an eyewitness selecting a
suspect by guessing rather than by recognition[,]" and comprising
lineups of more than six individuals "whenever practicable."177  The
ABA committee declined to make a general recommendation regarding
the retention or elimination of showup identifications.
17t
What both of these prominent American reports, and several other
high-profile ones not specifically noted here, have in common is that
they all agree that a minimum number of fillers is crucial to more reliable
identifications.1 79 In this area of general consensus lies one of the most
significant differences between the requirements of the BiH CPC and
174. Wells et al., supra note 34, at 609.
175. See id. at 627-36. The purpose of this recommended procedure is to prevent the
increase in an eyewitness's confidence between the pretrial and trial identifications from
playing a role in the jury's assessment of the credibility of the identification. See id. at
636.
176. See ABA REPORT, supra note 110, at 24-26.
177. Id. at 25-26, 35-36.
178. See id. at 38-39. The committee report reflected two potentially competing
concerns: the highly suggestive nature of showups and the concern that the alternative
might be "a poorly constructed lineup." Id. at 39 (citing Michael J. Saks et al., Model
Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convictions Act, 33 ARiz. ST. L. REV. 665, 687
(2001)). The committee also noted that "many representatives of law enforcement ...
described show-ups as common and as essential to effective law enforcement." Id.
179. See Thompson, supra note 135, at 42-55.
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those of the U.S. Constitution. 180 Perhaps one of the most significant
comparative aspects of the BiH CPC eyewitness-identification
requirements is that they mandate that prospective eyewitnesses
participate in lineups (in which an eyewitness picks from multiple
individuals, one of whom may or may not be the suspected perpetrator)
rather than showups (in which an eyewitness is shown a single
individual, the suspect, and asked to indicate whether the suspect is the
perpetrator),'8 1 both of which are routinely permitted under the Due
Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.182  This requirement is
consistent with the AP/LS recommendation precluding the use of
showups.1
83
The concerns with showups are probably self-evident.8 4  The
purpose of fillers in a lineup is to reduce the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure and draw errors away from the suspect and
toward the fillers.185  Showups, in contrast, are inherently biased
contextually. As Cicchini and Easton explain: "Eyewitnesses often
believe that when an officer presents a suspect for identification, the
officer has caught the true perpetrator. Few people would think that an
officer would show a suspect without truly believing that the suspect
was, in fact, the criminal.' 8 6  If witnesses trust and respect legal
authorities and believe that police procedures are generally fair, the
pressure to validate a one-person lineup may be difficult to resist. 187
180. A small minority of American jurisdictions requires, either by statute, under
their state constitution, or under their common law, greater protections against unreliable
eyewitness identifications than that which the Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution require. For example, in 2007, North Carolina became the first state to
require, by statute, statewide sequential double-blind lineups and photo arrays, without
exception. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(b)(2) (2007). West Virginia requires that
eyewitnesses draft a confidence statement and that the police create a written record of
identification procedures. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-2 (LexisNexis 2014).
181. See Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003, c. 8, § 5, art.
85(3).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Hamilton, 469 F.2d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1972).
183. See Wells, supra note 34, at 630-32.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Funches, 84 F.3d 249, 254 (7th Cir. 1996). The court
reasoned that "[a] show-up is inherently suggestive because the witness is likely to be
influenced by the fact that the police appear to believe the person brought in is guilty,
since presumably the police would not bring in someone that they did not suspect had
committed the crime." Id (internal citation omitted).
185. See Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay, Reforming Eyewitness Identification:
Cautionary Lineup Instructions; Weighing the Advantages and Disadvantages of Show-
ups Versus Lineups, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 341, 349 (2006); see also
Wells & Seelau, supra note 121, at 766.
186. Cicchini & Easton, supra note 50, at 389.
187. See A. Daniel Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups
andLineups, 20 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 459, 459 (1996).
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Because the identity of the suspect, regardless of guilt, is obvious, it is
difficult to determine whether the witness is making the identification
from memory or merely deducing which person the police believe to be
the perpetrator.1 88 Furthermore, witnesses (and suspects) are unlikely to
be aware of the likelihood and dangers of subtle suggestibility
influencing an inaccurate identification.18 9 This is especially true in
showup confrontations that occur in the field during "drive-by"
identifications.'90 The greatest danger under these circumstances is that
false identifications of innocent suspects, who resemble the perpetrator,
in contextually biased one-person identification procedures are likely to
be very high in contrast to identifications made from many-person
lineups.191
Studies have confirmed the intuition that showups result in even
more false identifications than lineups.192 One recent large-scale field
experiment confirmed the relative inaccuracy of identifications (false "hit
scores") in showups when compared to lineups.193 Individual witnesses
were asked to identify a young woman they had spoken to a few minutes
earlier in a natural setting.'94  The study found that the accuracy of
identification in six-person simultaneously presented photographic
lineups was significantly superior to identification in one-person
photographic lineups when choices were corrected for guessing.195 The
diagnosticity index in the study was twice as high in the six-person as in
the one-person lineups, suggesting that the probative value of
188. See id. at 459-60.
189. See J.D. Grano, A Legal Response to the Inherent Dangers of Eyewitness
Identification Testimony, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
315, 315-35 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Loftus eds., 1984).
190. See Yarmey et al., supra note 187, at 460.
191. See id.
192. See Richard Gonzalez et al., Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 527 (1993) (finding that test subjects in
experimental showups correctly identified the perpetrator 30% of the time, while test
subjects in experimental lineups correctly identified the perpetrator 67% of the time);
Wells et al., supra note 34, at 630-31 ("[T]here is clear evidence that showups are more
likely to yield false identifications than are properly constructed lineups."); see also Amy
Luria, Showup Identifications: A Comprehensive Overview of the Problems and a
Discussion of Necessary Changes, 86 NEB. L. REV. 515, 543-44 (2008); R.C.L. Lindsay
et al., Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification
Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 391, at 391 (1997); Nancy
Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentation: A
Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 523, 523 (2003); Yarmey et al., supra
note 187, at 460.





identification decisions from six-persons lineups is greater than from
showups. 1
96
Another experiment compared one-person and six-person
photographic lineup identifications in field situations, immediately, 30
minutes, 2 hours, and 24 hours after a 15-second encounter with a
target.197 The study found that the accuracy of performance was superior
in six-person lineups than in showups over time, concluding that the
likelihood of a false identification of a lookalike innocent suspect was
significantly greater in showups than in six-person lineups, especially
when the innocent suspect wore the same clothing as the culprit. 1
98
2. Defending the Showup
Nonetheless, showups are common in the United States.199 There
are several reasons why American police agencies have been resistant o
abolishing showups. Some are suspect; some are legitimate. The most
common rationales for permitting showups are that they occur much
more quickly than multi-party lineups and that juries can understand their
suggestibility concerns and assess their credibility appropriately.200
While the idea that juries can accurately process the relationship between
the suggestibility of the identification procedure and the reliability of the
196. See id.; Gary L. Wells & R.C.L. Lindsay, On Estimating the Diagnosticity of
Eyewitness Nonidentifications, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 776, (1980). Whether the results of
this study can be generalized, however, is speculative because testing was conducted
within minutes of the encounter. See also Yarmey et al., supra note 187.
197. See Yarmey et al, supra note 187, at 461.
198. See id. at 468.
199. See ABA REPORT, supra note 110, at 39; Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L.
Davey, Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 475, 479 (2001) (documenting the use of 258 field showups in 271 cases
that they analyzed); Cicchini & Easton, supra note 50, at 388; Gonzalez et al., supra note
191, at 535 ("In our sample showup identifications were over three times more common
than lineups . . ... "); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness
Misidentification, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 639, 646 (2009) (noting that "show-ups constitute
one of the most commonly used identification procedures").
200. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 192, at 525; Steblay, supra note 185, at 348-49;
Gary L. Wells, Police Lineups: Data, Theory, & Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
791, 795-96 (2001); see, e.g., People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 657 (N.Y. 1991)
(permitting a showup identification to be admitted at Duuvon's trial, despite New York's
general "disfavoring" of them in the absence of exigent circumstances, because of
"temporal considerations"); see also Commonwealth v. Ye, 756 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2001) (permitting the use of a showup because it was conducted within 90
minutes of the crime and justified by special need, over Massachusetts's general
presumption against their admissibility); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 857 N.E.2d 1096
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (permitting the use of a showup identification because assembling
a photo array would have taken additional time). See generally Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 131 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that "the greatest memory
loss occurs within hours after an event").
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resulting identification has been thoroughly debunked,2° 1 the concern
with speed is a more legitimate one. Generally speaking, the police can
conduct a showup much more quickly than a full lineup because they do
not have to secure fillers prior to administering it, and cognitive science
has demonstrated that witnesses' memories fade quickly.
20 2
Several American courts have held that showup confrontations that
occur within a short time period of an incident contribute to the accuracy
of identification.20 3 The case of Simmons v. United States204 in which
the Supreme Court declined to adopt a per se rule prohibiting showup
identifications, exemplifies American courts' general preference for
speedy showups over delayed lineups. Simmons was convicted of armed
bank robbery, largely on the basis of eyewitness identifications by bank
205employees. The day after the bank robbery, FBI agents showed
photographs of Simmons to five bank employees who had witnessed the
robbery, and each witness identified Simmons from his photographs.0 6
During his trial, all five bank employees again identified Simmons as one
of the robbers.207  Rejecting Simmons's claim that his pretrial
photographic identification was so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to misidentification as to deny him due process, the Supreme
Court noted that, with the bank robbers still at large, it had been essential
for FBI agents to determine swiftly whether they were on the right track
in suspecting Simmons.208 The Court concluded that, "even though the
identification procedure employed may have in some respects fallen
short of the ideal," there was little chance that the procedure utilized led
201. See supra Part I & studies discussed therein. Scholarship on the subject reveals
that jurors' "common sense" intuitions about eyewitness identification are the opposite of
what cognitive-science studies have demonstrated. For example, jurors tend to believe
that the more confident a witness seems, the more accurate that witness's testimony will
be. See Saul M. Kassin & Kimberly A. Barndollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness
Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1241, 1241 (1992). Research reveals, however, that the correlation between a
witness's expression of certainty in an identification and its accuracy is unwarranted. See
supra Part I and studies cited therein.
202. See supra Part I.
203. See, e.g., Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1068 (D.C. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Mass. 1995) (permitting showups
"in the immediate aftermath of a crime"); Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d at 656 (admitting a
showup identification in large part because it was conducted "within minutes" of the
crime).
204. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
205. See id. at 399.
206. See id. at 380. While the witnesses were shown multiple photographs of
Simmons and other men, the procedure that the police used was not a photographic
lineup. Instead, the photographs consisted primarily of group photographs, with
Simmons appearing several times in the series. See id. at 385.
207. See id. at 381.
208. Id. at 385.
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to Simmons's misidentification, particularly in light of the fact that
"none of the witnesses displayed any doubt about their respective
identifications of Simmons.20 9
The Bosnian experience suggests that this choice-speed versus
fillers-is a false one. Although the Bosnian police concede that finding
a sufficient number and quality of fillers is always a challenge, they also
claim that their efforts to do so do not significantly delay their
investigations.10
3. Consequences of Suggestive or Unreliable Practices
The BiH CPC details an explicit set of procedures that must be
followed in pretrial eyewitness identifications and establishes a black-
letter exclusionary rule for identifications made under circumstances that
do not meet those requirements. Several of the procedures required by
the BiH CPC are consistent with the recommendations of the AP/LS and
the ABA, including larger lineups of six to nine individuals total. The
United States, on the other hand, leaves largely to the lay jury the task of
determining when an identification procedure has been so suggestive or
unreliable that a subsequent in-court identification should not be
believed.
4. Bosnian Eyewitness-Identification Requirements and the
Innocent
Bosnia has a lot to teach the United States about stricter eyewitness-
identification rules. As a general rule, all of the criminal-justice
stakeholders in Bosnia seem to think that their eyewitness-identification
provisions have worked well and, perhaps more importantly, that, when
they have not, the fault is not that of the criminal-procedure code or its
lineup-composition requirements. They also seem unanimously to think
that their practices are better than that of the United States at getting at
the truth and were routinely horrified when confronted with a description
of the showup procedure permitted by American courts. As one police
officer explained: "A lineup is a better procedure, especially if you want
to find the truth and think that you have the right suspect.,
211
209. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385.
210. MUPS Interview, supra note 140. According to the police, they conduct their
lineup procedures "as quickly as possible" to mitigate the effects of delay. See id. In
order to fill their lineups quickly, the police in Bosnia are empowered to recruit civilians,
occasionally combing nearby cafes and shopping malls for passable fillers. See id.
211. MUPS Interview, supra note 140. Of course, Bosnia's identification practices
are not perfect. For example, the Bosnians do not employ blind administrators during
their identification procedures. Nonetheless, the prohibition against the use of showups is
a significant improvement over the American rules governing eyewitness identification.
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5. Photoshop to the Rescue
Of course, one obvious limitation of using the Bosnian experience
in support of the claim that lineups-in comparison to showups-do not
significantly delay investigations or increase the retention interval
between eyewitnesses' observations and subsequent identification
procedures is that Bosnia is almost entirely heterogeneous ethnically.
While it may be easy for law-enforcement officers in Bosnia to step into
a nearby caf6 or mall and grab five people who are equally similar to the
eyewitness's description of the perpetrator as the suspect,212 such a
technique, even if legally authorized, might not bear the same easy fruit
in the United States.
Although the Bosnian experience suggests that increased risk of
suggestiveness inherent in showups can and should trump the benefit of
their speedier administration, increasingly the choice between speed and
fillers, even in a multiethnic society like the United States, is a false one
anyway. In the United States, the television-show lineup is increasingly
being replaced with the photographic array.213 The combination of
photographic lineups, digital photography, and photograph-enhancement
software like Photoshop has made the need for high-quality live fillers
much less pressing.214
B. Exclusionary Rules and Deterrence
A few American states have used their state constitutions or
supervisory powers to modify the federal exclusionary rule for
identifications stemming from suggestive procedures.215 As a general
rule, however, even the American jurisdictions with the most stringent
requirements for eyewitness-identification evidence do not enforce those
rules with an inflexible exclusionary rule. Wisconsin, for example,
which has directed the adoption of "best practices" by statute, permits
divergent implementation of those practices at the local level.2 16
This has led to a debate among American scholars about whether
the United States should adopt a statute like Article 85 of the BiH CPC,
with a strict exclusionary rule. As Wells and Quinlivan have explained
in critiquing the current Brathwaite test: "There is almost no threat of
exclusion resulting from the use of suggestive procedures .... [T]he
inflated certainty, statement of view, and statement of attention resulting
212. MUPS Interview, supra note 140.
213. See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 16 (noting that a significant
percentage of American jurisdictions "use only photographs and never use live lineups").
214. See Fahrenthold, supra note 14, at AO1.
215. See supra Part II and cases discussed therein.
216. See Thompson, supra note 135, at 57, 62.
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from suggestive procedures effectively guards against exclusion, thereby
undermining incentives to avoid suggestive procedures.'21 7  Several
other American legal scholars have agreed that the Brathwaite test fails
to discourage the use of suggestive procedures, advocating for expanding
the exclusionary rule in the United States so that unreliable eyewitness-
identification evidence is never admitted at trial, at least in the absence of
corroborating evidence.21 8 Sandra Guerra Thompson has concluded that
the United State should enact a statute regulating eyewitness
identification "with few exceptions for practicability concerns and with
serious consequences for failures to follow the procedures.,219 Margery
Koosed has argued that more stringent eyewitness-identification
procedures and a tighter exclusionary rule are necessary in capital and
related cases to avoid executing an innocent person.220 Amy Luria has
advocated making inadmissible any showup identification that was
conducted absent exigency, not in close temporal proximity to the
witnessing event, or without the presence of counsel.221 Katherine Kruse
has advocated a flexible exclusionary rule, like the one that Wisconsin
follows.222
217. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 17; see also id. at 20 (proposing shifting
the burden from the defendant to prove the unreliability of an eyewitness identification to
the prosecution to prove "that the identification was reliable regardless of whether a
suggestive procedure was necessary").
218. See, e.g., Koosed, Reforming, supra note 19, at 626 (arguing that the Brathwaite
approach "not only undermines incentives to avoid suggestive procedures but also
provides an incentive to use suggestive procedures"); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking
the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial Identification Procedures: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 304 (1990) ("[I]f a per se rule were enforced,
the police would soon stop using unnecessarily suggestive procedures.").
219. Thompson, supra note 135, at 57; see Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 17-
18 (contending that lower courts have failed to follow the Brathwaite test's modest
constraints and noting that as long as the test "continues to be applied the way it is today,
there is no reason to expect the contingencies and incentives themselves to somehow
reduce the use of suggestive identification procedures").
220. See Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won 't-
Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 310-12
(2002) (advocating a rule permitting an in-court eyewitness identification only if the
prosecution could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prior identification
was not conducive to irreparable mistaken identification); see also Koosed, Reforming,
supra note 19, at 624-25 (advocating that American courts return to the per se
exclusionary rule that the Supreme Court originally articulated in Stovall).
221. See Luria, supra note 192, at 543-44; see also O'Toole & Shay, supra note 19,
at 109; David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to
Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 583, 607 (1987)
(advocating a per se exclusionary rule for evidence from unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedures); Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 17, at 5 (arguing that, rather
than deterring suggestive procedures, the Brathwaite test "has had the unintended
consequence of setting up conditions that create a positive incentive for police to use
suggestive procedures").
222. See Kruse, supra note 135, at 647-48.
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Opponents of these proposals, on the other hand, generally
emphasize a preference for flexible standards over per se rules and
specifically emphasize the evidentiary costs to the system of a strict
exclusionary rule for eyewitness identifications resulting from suggestive
procedures.223
Bosnia's experience with the eyewitness-identification procedures
of the CPC provides support for the former view (the existence of a
deterrence effect from a stricter exclusionary rule) rather than the latter
(the truth-hampering critique thereof). In Bosnia, there are very few
defense challenges to eyewitness-identification procedures and even
fewer challenges in situations in which there is no other substantial
evidence of guilt.224 In fact, the police in Bosnia claim that there have
been no defense challenges to identifications conducted under the
procedures of the CPC, particularly because the defendant has an
unqualified right to the presence of counsel at all pretrial identification
procedures,225 which suggests that the real cost of a stricter exclusionary
rule is the loss of unnecessarily suggestive procedures in the first
instance, rather than the loss of the evidence that they produce.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States has acknowledged: "The
few cases that have surfaced therefore reveal the existence of a [pretrial-
identification] process attended with hazards of serious unfairness to the
criminal accused and strongly suggest the plight of the more numerous
defendants who are unable to ferret out suggestive influences in the
secrecy of the confrontation.226 In fact, "most [DNA] exonerees had no
successful [legal] basis for challenging what we now know to be
incorrect eyewitness identifications.,
227
The Bosnian experience suggests that one simple and relatively
costless approach that the United States could take to decrease the
number of wrongful convictions stemming from mistaken identifications
is to adopt a per se rule prohibiting identification procedures without a
sufficient number of fillers, in other words banning the showup, and
enforcing the rule with an exclusionary remedy forbidding the
223. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012); Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977).
224. Vucinic Interview, supra note 129; cf Luria, supra note 192, at 540 ("[P]olice
officers have little incentive to use more reliable methods of identification, such as a
lineup, because the showup identification will not be suppressed.").
225. MUPS Interview, supra note 140.
226. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1967).
227. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECLITIONs Go WRONG 188 (2011).
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consideration of the results of showup procedures by the jury in
determining guilt or innocence. Contrary to the suggestion of the often
false admission/exclusion dichotomy, the Bosnian experience suggests
that banning the showup would simply increase the use of more reliable
forms of identification procedures, like full lineups and photographic
arrays.
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APPENDIX A
Crime Investigation Division of the Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Internal Affairs
Police Department ("MUPS") Eyewitness Form
[As translated from Bosnian by Carrie Leonetti]
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
XXXXX Canton






Transpired on xx.xx.2012 and attended by
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, regarding the interview of witness
xxxxxxx from Sarajevo in relation to the proceeding about
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.
PRESENT 1. --------- ,prosecutor, Cantonal Prosecutor's Office
in Sarajevo (not present - notice),




Witness proceeding initiated on xx.xx.2012 at 00:00 o'clock.
Pursuant o art. 8 & 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina you were notified of the criminal procedures and the
duty of equal usage of the languages of BiH, Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian and
both alphabets - Cyrillic and Latin. Inasmuch as you do not understand a
language, you are guaranteed translation of your statements, as well as the
warrant and other demonstrative material.
Do you understand these instructions? Yes
Witness affirmation:
I do not need an interpreter
(witness signature)
Pursuant o article 100 paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina you are admonished that you are
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obligated to tell the truth. You are not permitted to hold anything back. Be
aware that giving a false statement is a felony act prohibited by article 348 of the
Criminal Code of the Federation of BiH, which is punishable by a sentence of 6
months to 5 years. Be aware that you are not obligated to answer a question as
provided in article 98 paragraph 1 of the CPC ofF BiH.
I have understood this warning as certified by my signature.
(witness signature)
The witness in the meaning of article 100 para. 3 of the Federation of BiH Code
of Criminal Procedure gives the following data by himself:
Name and surname:
Father's name and sumame:
Mother's name and maiden name: .,born:
Birth date:
Place of birth:




Are you and where are you employed:
Relationship to suspect and injured party:
Identity determined by the peculiarities of the statement and inspection of the
personal identity number _,extraneous costs
Contact telephone:
(witness signature)
Be aware that you are obliged to inform the Prosecution and Court of your
change in address or change in residence.
Pursuant to article 95 paras. 5, 6, and 17 of the Federation of BiH Code of
Criminal Procedure you are obligated to answer each notification of the
Prosecution and the Court unless you are unable to attend and notify the
Prosecution and the Court of the reasons. If you do not comply with this notice
you can be punished with a monetary penalty of 5,000 KM, and you will be
subjected to mandatory production. You are obligated to testify. If you refuse
to testify in Court it could punish you with a monetary penalty of 30,000 KM.
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Pursuant to article 97 of the Federation of Bil Code of Criminal Procedure be
aware that you have the right to decline to testify if you are the suspect's spouse,
domestic partner or parent or child, adoptive parent or adoptive child.
Witness's reply: affirmative statement
(witness signature)
Pursuant to article 98 of Federation of BiH Code of Criminal Procedure you
have the right not to respond to questions if a truthful response would expose
you to a criminal prosecution, unless you want to respond to the questions and
you request immunity. Immunity is given to you by the prosecutor. Unless you
are given immunity at that time and you are obligated to testify in response to
these questions, you are unable to be criminally prosecuted except if you give a
false statement. You have the right to request that the Court appoint you an
attorney, unless you have the capacity by yourself to protect your rights as a
witness.
Pursuant to article 105 of the Federation of BiH Code of Criminal Procedure
you can request that you convene a hearing on the protected properties or
endangered witness in accordance with the Law on the Protection of Witnesses
under Threat or Endangered Witnesses.
Do you understand these advices? Yes.
Witness's reply: affirmative to all necessary notices.
(witness signature)
Whence the witness is informed of his given rights next:
STATEMENT
Whence I have been approached in the official rooms of the MPDs of the
Sarajevo Canton as well as extraneous police officials familiar with the occasion
of my summons, I give the following statement:
I was
Pursuant o article 168 para. 1 of the Federation of BiH Criminal Procedure
Code you have the right to read the record or demand that the same be read to
you, as well as to insert an objection about the contents of the record.




Do you have an objection to the contents of the record? No




I do not have anything else to declare, I have heard aloud the dictation of the
record, and in the same has been inserted all that I have declared without
objection to the record, and I sign to indicate the same.
Witness proceeding terminated on xx.xx.2012 at 00:00 o'clock.
WitnessRecording Secretary Prosecutor
not present
Authorized officials
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